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PROPOSED MARYLAND JURY INSTRUCTION
ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION
David E. Aaronson*
Introduction
This article discusses the merits of a specific jury
instruction on cross-racial identification for use in criminal
cases when eyewitness identification is the central or critical
issue, little or no corroborating evidence is presented, and the
circumstances raise doubts about the reliability of the identification.
A proposed instruction developed for use in Maryland
is as follows:
In this case, the defendant, _______________ (insert
name), is of a different race than ________________
(insert name of identifying witness), the witness who
has identified [him][her]. You may consider, if you
think it is appropriate to do so, whether the fact that the
defendant is of a different race than the witness has
affected the accuracy of the witness’ original perception or the accuracy of a later identification. You
should consider that in ordinary human experience,
some people may have greater difficulty in accurately
identifying members of a different race than they do in
identifying members of their own race.
You may also consider whether there are other factors
present in this case which overcome any such difficulty of identification. [For example, you may conclude
that the witness had sufficient contacts with members
of the defendant’s race that [he][she] would not have
greater difficulty in making a reliable identification.]1
This instruction is intended to supplement standard
jury instructions identifying factors to be considered in evaluating eyewitness identifications including: (1) the opportunity for
the witness to observe the offense and the person committing
the offense, including the length of time the witness had to
observe the person committing the offense, the distance
between the witness and the person committing the offense, and
the lighting conditions at the time; (2) the witness’ state of mind
at the time of the offense; (3) the witness’ degree of attention to
the person during the commission of the offense; (4) whether
the witness knew or had seen the person before; and (5) the
accuracy of any prior description of the person given by the witness.
The jury is also instructed that it may consider the circumstances of any earlier identification that occurred out of
court, such as: (1) the length of time between the offense and
the identification; (2) any statements made by the police officer(s) prior to or during the identification procedure; (3) the
state of mind of the witness at the time of the identification; and
(4) any misidentification by the witness or failure to identify the
defendant. In addition, jurors are instructed to consider the
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credibility of the identifying witness, including any interest or
bias the witness may have in the outcome of a case and other
factors affecting credibility.
The Need for a Jury Instruction
on Cross-Racial Identification
The purpose of a specific jury instruction on crossracial identification is to permit juries to consider the increased
possibility of misidentification in determining whether or not
there is sufficient evidence of guilt.
Jury instructions specifically tailored to safeguard
against cross-racial identification errors would serve to enhance
fairness and confidence in the criminal justice system, especially in situations where there is little or no corroborating evidence
to substantiate the eyewitness identifications. In appropriate
cases, instructions addressing the enhanced risk of cross-racial
misidentification should be given after the general instructions
regarding identification and credibility of witnesses so that
jurors have the means to evaluate the accuracy of the identification.
Research shows that persons of one racial or ethnic
group have more difficulty distinguishing among individual
faces of another group than among faces of their own group.2
An inaccurate identification due to the so-called “own race”
effect may result in higher wrongful conviction rates when
defendants are of different races than the witnesses who identify them.3 Studies show that persons who primarily interact
within their own racial group, especially if they are in the
majority, will better perceive and process the subtlety of facial
features of persons within their own racial group than persons
of other racial groups.4
For example, during a recent misdemeanor trial in a
Maryland state courthouse, an eyewitness to a criminal offense
identified a student attorney in the American University
Washington College of Law’s Criminal Justice Clinic, rather
than the defendant, as the perpetrator of the crime. The eyewitness, a Hispanic man, made a statement prior to trial identifying the defendant, an African American man, as the perpetrator
and explained that he had known the defendant for three years.
When asked to identify the perpetrator at trial, however, he
pointed to the African American law student representing the
defendant, resulting in an immediate dismissal of the charges.5
Unfortunately, cross-racial courtroom misidentifications are
rarely as obvious as the one in this example.
Traditional trial protections of suppression hearings,
voir dire, cross-examination of witnesses, closing arguments,
and jury instructions on the credibility of witnesses and evaluation of eyewitness testimony do not adequately address the special recognition impairments often present in cross-racial eyewitness identifications. Abshire and Bornstein state that
“[m]uch of the reason for juries’ erroneous convictions based
on faulty eyewitness identifications is that jurors are not very
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sensitive to the factors that determine eyewitness accuracy.”6
The additional protection of a cross-racial jury instruction is
needed, as stated by Johnson, “because the own-race effect
strongly influences the accuracy of identification, because that
influence is not understood by the average juror, because crossexamination cannot reveal its effects, and because jurors are
unlikely to discuss racial factors freely without some authorization to do so.”7

studies “have been conducted with slightly different results
from one study to another but with a generally consistent pattern.”12 The studies show not only a greater difficulty in recognizing faces of another race, but members of one race also have
more difficulty reconstructing faces of other races.13
Studies and collected data indicate that this “own race”
effect applies across racial groups: Caucasians, African
Americans, Asian Americans, and Latino Americans are better
able to recognize members of their own race than members of
Race, Ethnicity and Cross-Racial Identification Studies
another race. A recent ABA report concluded: “Cross-racial identifications are generally inferior to within-race identifications.”14
For example, one study found that both Japanese and
Although eyewitness identifications are often reliable
Chinese Americans are significantly better at recognizing Asian
and persuasive evidence, thirty years of social science research
American faces than African American faces.15 They are also
and the contributions of the Innocence Project, a national
better at recognizing African American faces than Caucasian
organization dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted
faces.16 Additionally, the study reported that Japanese
persons through DNA testing, have shown that erroneous eyeAmericans are only marginally better at recognizing Japanese
witness identifications are the single greatest
American faces than Chinese Americans faces,
cause of wrongful convictions nationwide.
and the reverse is equally consistent for Chinese
Approximately three-quarters of the more than
Studies and collected Americans recognizing Japanese American
200 wrongful convictions in the United States
data indicate that this faces.17
overturned through DNA testing resulted from
“own race” effect
The research on cross-ethnicity identificaeyewitness misidentifications.8 Of the seventyapplies across racial tion is less clear-cut. At least one state
seven percent of cases, where race is known, groups... A recent ABA supreme court, authorizing a cross-racial jury
forty-eight percent of the cases involved crossreport concluded:
instruction in certain situations, has held that
racial eyewitness identifications.9
“Cross-racial identifica- studies on cross-ethnicity identification—as
Why do persons of one racial group tions are generally infe- opposed to studies of cross-racial identificagenerally have greater difficulty identifying per- rior to within-race iden- tion—do not provide enough support to warsons of another racial group than among faces of
tifications.”
rant a specific jury instruction.18
their own group? Loftus, Doyle and Dysart
state:
Federal Jurisdictions Permitting the Use
Many possible explanations of the cross-racial effects
of a Cross-Racial Identification Jury Instruction
have been offered; for example, the effects are due to
differential experience with members of a different
In United States v. Telfaire,19 the D.C. Circuit affirmed
race, to prejudicial attitudes about members of differthe
defendant’s
conviction when the trial court refused, in the
ent races, or to different modes of processing faces of
absence
of
a
request,
to give a special instruction on identificaanother race. These have been thoroughly
tion
finding
that
the
witness had an adequate opportunity to
reviewed. The best explanation seems to be that peo20 The court went on to create a model
observe
the
defendant.
ple make more mistakes on a cross-racial identificaidentification
instruction
to deal with the shortcomings in the
tion for a number of reasons, including, but not limitidentification
process,
though
this instruction omitted considered to, the amount of contact with persons from other
ation
of
the
races
of
the
defendant
and the witness.21 To address
racial groups, the amount of attention paid to other
this
deficiency,
Chief
Judge
David
L. Bazelon in a concurring
race persons, and time spent encoding features that are
opinion
stressed
the
problems
surrounding
cross-racial identifiless useful in discriminating people from other groups
10
cations
and
advocated
for
the
addition
of
the following lan(footnotes omitted).
guage to the court’s model identification instruction:
A classic study by psychologists Roy Malpass and
In this case the identifying witness is of a different
Jerome Kravitz compared recognition and memory of identifirace than the defendant. In the experience of many it is
cation of persons among students at Howard University, a premore difficult to identify members of a different race
dominantly black university, and the University of Illinois, a
than members of one’s own. If this is also your own
predominantly white university. Photographs of black and
experience, you may consider it in evaluating the witwhite males were shown to the students and later the subjects
ness’s testimony. You must also consider, of course,
were tested. Subjects recognized faces of their own race better
whether there are other factors present in this case
than faces of the other race. A striking finding was that white
which overcome any such difficulty of identification.
subjects from the University of Illinois made two to three times
For example, you may conclude that the witness has
as many false identifications when attempting to identify black
had sufficient contacts with members of the defenfaces of students from Howard University than when attempt11
dant’s race that he would not have greater difficulty in
ing to identify white faces.
making a reliable identification.22
Since the study by Malpass and Kravitz, many other
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Most circuits have approved the Telfaire recommended model identification instruction, but not the specific instruction on cross-racial identification in Judge Bazelon’s concurring
opinion. Although many circuits agree that the recommended
model identification instruction may or should be given when
identification is the key issue in the case and the identification
testimony is uncertain, only some circuits require the instruction to be given in these circumstances.24
Maryland Case Law Addressing the Use of a
Cross-Racial Identification Jury Instruction
In 2004, the Maryland intermediate appellate court,
the Court of Special Appeals, in Smith v. State,25 affirmed the
conviction of the defendant, an African American man, of
attempted robbery and related offenses, based on the identification and testimony of the victim, a Caucasian woman. At trial,
the defendant’s counsel requested Chief Judge Bazelon’s jury
instruction on cross-racial identification from his concurring
opinion in Telfaire.26 The trial court refused to give the instruction, instead instructing the jury on the shortcomings of eyewitness identification in general.27
In reviewing the trial record, the Court of Special
Appeals noted that the victim had significant opportunity to
observe the defendant at the time of the crime and gave the
police a detailed description immediately afterwards.28 At trial,
the victim stated that she was “extremely good with faces.”29
The victim, an artist and teacher, lived in a mixed-race neighborhood and had the ability to focus on facial features. The jury
heard the victim cross-examined and could find her credible as
an observer of human faces.30 The court held that the evidence
did not indicate that the victim had problems distinguishing the
faces of different African Americans and, therefore, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion both in refusing to give a specific jury instruction on cross-racial identification and in rejecting the defendant’s claim that the cross-racial identification
required special emphasis in closing argument.31
Maryland’s highest court, the Court of Appeals,
reviewing the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, agreed
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case, but
given another set of facts, the court stated that it may be appropriate for a trial court to give an instruction on cross-racial identification.32 The court held, however, that the trial court erred
in prohibiting defense counsel from commenting on the crossracial identification in its closing argument, stating that
“[g]enerally, counsel has the right to make any comment or
argument that is warranted by the evidence proved or the inferences therefrom.”33 Because the victim’s identification of the
defendant was anchored in her “enhanced ability” to identify
faces, the defense counsel’s request to discuss the problems that
arise as a result of cross-racial identification should have been
allowed.34
State Jurisdictions Permitting the Use
of a Cross-Racial Jury Instruction
A few state appellate courts either require or authorize
a cross-racial identification jury instruction, including
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California, Utah, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.
California
California Jury Instruction No. 2.92 includes the crossracial instruction in a short “laundry list” of items that may be
considered. The California jury instruction states:
Eyewitness testimony has been received in this trial
for the purposes of identifying the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime[s] charged. In determining the
weight to be given eyewitness identification testimony, you should consider the believability of the eyewitness as well as other factors which bear upon the
accuracy of the witness’ identification of the defendant, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
. . . The cross racial [or ethnic] nature of the
identification. . . .35
People v. Palmer36 is an example of a case in which
the California Court of Appeals reversed a robbery conviction
based solely on eyewitness identifications of uncertain reliability.37 The court held on retrial that the defendant would be entitled to an instruction that included, as one factor, the crossracial nature of the identifications.38
Utah
In 1986 in State v. Long, the Utah Supreme Court
abandoned the discretionary approach and mandated trial courts
to give the instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a
central issue and is requested by the defense.39 The Utah court
stated that a well-constructed cautionary jury instruction would
pinpoint identification as a central issue and highlight the factors that bear on its reliability.40 Furthermore, a cautionary
instruction must “respect the jury’s function and strike a reasonable balance between protecting the innocent and convicting the
guilty.”41 The Long court noted that a proper instruction sensitizes the jury to external and internal or subjective factors that
empirical research has shown to be important in determining
the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.42 The Utah
Supreme Court indicated that the following instruction would
“certainly satisfy our expressed concerns about the need for
cautionary instructions.”43
. . .You should also consider whether the witness is of
a different race than the criminal actor. Identification
by a person of a different race may be less reliable than
identification by a person of the same race.44
New Jersey
The New Jersey instruction provides more specificity
than the California instruction in explaining to jurors the potential dangers of cross-racial identifications. New Jersey permits
the jury to consider the following specific factors in the appropriate case:
The fact that an identifying witness is not of the same
race as the perpetrator and/or defendant, and whether
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that fact might have had an impact on the accuracy of
the witness’ original perception, and/or the accuracy of
the subsequent identification.

with a measure of favorable intention to grant it.”57
Massachusetts courts have approved of the following instruction:

You should consider that in ordinary human experience, people may have greater difficulty in identifying
members of a different race.45

[You] may consider the fact of any cross-racial identification and whether the identification by a person of
different race from the defendant may be less reliable
than identification by a person of the same race.58

State v. Cromedy46 is an example of a Supreme Court
of New Jersey case in which use of the suggested cross-racial
How Proposed Model Instruction Compares
instruction should be considered. In August 1992, an African
to Federal and State Instructions
American man raped a Caucasian woman. The police were
notified and received a description from the victim of an
The proposed Maryland model cross-racial jury
African American male in his late 20s to early 30s, about fiveinstruction draws upon the language of various federal and state
feet, five-inches tall, with a medium build, mustache, and
instructions, especially the jury instructions in Telfaire and
unkempt hair.47 Eight months later, the victim saw an African
Cromedy. This instruction should serve as a model for state
American male across the street from her whom she thought
courts because it properly explains the cross-racial identificawas her attacker. She studied his face and gait as he walked
tion theory, instructs the jury that it may dispast her, and then went home to call the
count the validity of a cross-racial identificapolice.48 Fifteen minutes later, the defendant
was picked up by the police, and the victim “In the experience of many tion, and permits the jury to trust that an idenidentified him in a show-up—a process of it is more difficult to iden- tification was correct.
identification usually occurring shortly after tify members of a different Similar to Telfaire and Cromedy and unlike
the California instruction, the proposed
arrest in which the accused is usually the only
instruction explains the meaning of the crossrace than members of
person observed by the victim—as both the
man she saw on the street and her attacker.
one’s own. If this is also racial identification theory: “You should consider that in ordinary human experience, some
During the trial, the state did not present any
forensic evidence linking the defendant to the your experience, you may people may have greater difficulty in accurateoffenses.49 Despite these circumstances, a jury consider it in evaluating ly identifying members of a different race than
found the defendant guilty of first-degree the witness’s testimony.” they do in identifying members of their own
race.”59 In addition, similar to Cromedy but
aggravated sexual assault.50
unlike the Telfaire instruction, the proposed
In Cromedy, the Supreme Court of
instruction explains to jurors that the cross-racial nature of the
New Jersey rejected the state’s argument that a cross-racial
identification may affect the witness’ original perception or the
identification instruction should not be required unless there is
accuracy of a later identification.
a demonstrated substantial agreement in the relevant scientific
The proposed model instruction uses objective lancommunity that cross-racial identification is significantly
guage similar to Cromedy by focusing on ordinary human expeimpaired.51 In addition, the court recognized that unrestricted
use of the cross-racial charge could be counter-productive, and
rience: “You should consider that in ordinary human experiit suggested that an appropriate instruction would carefully
ence, some people may have greater difficulty in accurately
delineate the context in which the jury is permitted to consider
identifying members of a different race than they do in identiracial differences.52 The court reversed the conviction and held
fying members of their own race.”60 This contrasts with the
that “a cross-racial instruction should be given only when, as in
language of the Telfaire instruction, which takes a subjective
the present case, identification is a critical issue in the case, and
approach advising jurors to consider the validity of a crossan eyewitness’s cross-racial identification is not corroborated
racial identification based on their personal beliefs about this
by other evidence giving it independent reliability.”53
theory: “In the experience of many it is more difficult to identiNew Jersey has also permitted cross-racial jury
fy members of a different race than members of one’s own. If
instructions in other cases.54 However, the Supreme Court of
this is also your experience, you may consider it in evaluating
New Jersey recently held that the Cromedy cross-racial jury
the witness’s testimony.”61 The proposed instruction’s use of
instruction is inapplicable when a cross-ethnic identification is
objective language permits a juror to discount a cross-racial
involved.55 The Romero court found “insufficient data to support the conclusion that, as a matter of due process, people of
identification, regardless of his or her personal experiences with
the same race but different ethnicity . . . require a Cromedy
identifying persons of a different race.
instruction whenever they are identified by someone of a differFinally, the proposed model instruction advises the
ent ethnicity.”56
jury that it is free to consider factors that may reduce the likelihood of a cross-racial misidentification, similar to the Telfaire
Massachusetts
instruction, but unlike the New Jersey, Utah, and Massachusetts
instructions. The proposed instruction states: “You may also
Although Massachusetts does not require the instrucconsider whether there are other factors present in this case
tion to be given, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts has held
which overcome any such difficulty of identification. (For
that “a judge should consider a request for such an instruction
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example, you may conclude that the witness had sufficient contacts with members of the defendant’s race that [he][she] would
not have greater difficulty in making a reliable identification.)”62 This language is important to an identification instruction because jurors need to be made aware of the relevance of
factors other than race in determining the validity of the crossracial identification; for example, the opportunity of the witness
to observe the suspect and the accuracy and degree of detail of
the description. Also, this language invites jurors to focus on
the witness’s contacts and experience with members of the
defendant’s race.
Arguments In Opposition to Use of CrossRacial Identification Jury Instruction
Courts have denied cross-racial jury instructions on
the basis that jurors are adequately equipped to consider eyewitness testimony in light of their own personal experiences and
common sense.63 Courts have also denied the instruction based
on the argument that it “raises that proposition to the level of a
rule of law, which implies a degree of certainty that social science rarely achieves and comes perilously close to a comment
on the evidence contrary to the constitutional restriction.”64
Judges in many states, unlike the federal court system, are not
permitted to comment to the jury about the evidence.
In Cromedy, the Supreme Court of New Jersey suggested that a cross-racial instruction should be given only when
identification is a critical issue in the case and when the identification is not corroborated by other additional evidence that
gives it independent reliability.65
Opponents of the instruction also argue that a crossracial instruction injects the issue of race into a case where it
does not belong and confuses the jury. Their concern is that
whenever the witness is of a different race or ethnic group, the
defendant may bring in race as an issue. Merely a difference in
race between the defendant and the identifying witness, however, does not require that the instruction be given.
Other Issues Relating to Cross-Racial
Identification Jury Instructions
Should a Preliminary Showing be Required of an
Increased Risk of Error Due to Cross-Racial Factors?
Should courts require defense counsel to elicit information from witnesses to determine the level of contact and
familiarity of the witness with persons of the defendant’s race
as a condition for giving the suggested jury instruction? When
requesting the cross-racial identification instruction, some
courts have required a preliminary showing of risk that the witness may be mistaken due to cross-racial factors.66 In Miller v.
State,67 the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the defense’s
requested jury instruction regarding cross-racial identification
improperly singled out the eyewitness testimony.68 The court
further held that the cross-racial instruction was adequately
covered by the general instruction regarding eyewitness identification.69
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Should Courts Permit Expert Witnesses to
Testify on Factors Affecting the Risk of
Mistaken Cross-Racial Identification?
Those who favor the admissibility of expert testimony
argue that it is crucial to the deliberative process that jurors are
educated on the potential errors in cross-racial identifications.
Jurors are more apt to comfortably discuss racial differences
without fear of discord in the jury room when they have
received testimony from an expert considering the possible
influence of racial differences as affecting the accuracy of the
identification. Also, they argue that the possibility of error in
cross-racial identifications is not within the ordinary knowledge
of many jurors.70
In Brodes v. State,71 the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that expert testimony would have aided the jury in evaluating the reliability of the identification because the expert would
have testified about factors affecting the accuracy of the identification.72 The court suggested that those factors were highly
relevant in the case, which involved cross-racial identifications
by victims at gunpoint.73 The court also stated that producing
an expert was the only way to present the proffered empirical
evidence to the jury.74
On the other hand, in State v. Coley,75 the Supreme
Court of Tennessee held that expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification is per se inadmissible because the reliability of eyewitness identification is within the common understanding of jurors aided by skillful cross-examination and an
appropriate jury instruction.76 Also, the court held that Tenn. R.
Evid. 702, requiring that expert testimony be admissible only if
it “substantially” assists the trier of fact, requires “a greater
showing of probative force than the federal rules of evidence or
the rules of evidence from those states that have followed the
federal rules, making the per se exclusion appropriate.”77 The
court’s recommended jury instruction, however, does not
include race as a factor for the jury to consider.78
Opponents of expert testimony argue that expert testimony is not needed on the cross-racial identification issue
because it is not too complicated an issue and jurors are able to
understand and apply the judges’ instructions. Deborah
Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General in the Criminal Division
of the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, argues that
experts may be costly for defendants, confuse the jury rather
than clarify the issues, and take up time.79 A principal drawback of the use of expert witnesses is the lack of their availability, especially for indigent defendants.
Some courts prefer a cross-racial instruction to expert
testimony: “We believe that the problem can be alleviated by a
proper cautionary instruction to the jury which sets forth the
factors to be considered in evaluating eyewitness testimony.”80
In Cromedy, the New Jersey court held that the defendant was
entitled to a cross-racial jury instruction, but not entitled to
expert testimony.81
Conclusion

In Smith v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals in
2005 stated that given another set of facts, it may be appropri-
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ate for a trial court to give a jury instruction on cross-racial
identification. Defense counsel should consider requesting a
cross-racial jury instruction in situations when the risk of a
misidentification and a wrongful conviction are highest: (1)
identification is a crucial issue in the case; (2) little or no
evidence corroborating eyewitness evidence is presented;
and (3) the circumstances raise doubts about the reliability of
the identification.
A specific jury instruction on cross-racial identification, such as the proposed model instruction, sensitizes
jurors to consider whether the fact that the defendant is of a
different race than the identifying witness has affected the
accuracy of the identification. Jurors are more apt to comfortably discuss racial differences with such an instruction.
The proposed model cross-racial jury instruction draws upon
various federal and state jury instructions, especially those in
Telfaire and Cromedy.
Defense counsel in cross-racial identification situations need to find out how much contact and experience
identifying witnesses have had with persons of a defendant’s
race. Some states, such as Indiana, require a preliminary
showing of a risk that the witness may have been mistaken
due to cross-racial factors.
Prosecutors will focus on the circumstances supporting the reliability of the eyewitness identification(s).
They should also highlight the degree of contact and experience of the identifying witness with persons of the defendant’s race, such as their residence in a mixed race neighborhood.
When loss of liberty and, possibly, the life of a
human being are at stake, the additional safeguard of a jury
instruction on cross-racial identification, such as the jury
instruction proposed in this article, is an important tool to
help protect against the heightened risk of eyewitness
misidentification and wrongful conviction.
DNA exonerations resulting from work of the
Innocence Project, supplemented by decades of scientific
research, dramatically spotlight eyewitness misidentification
as the leading cause of wrongful convictions in the United
States. A high percentage of these cases involve cross-racial
misidentifications. There is widespread consensus supported
by a substantial body of evidence that persons are less able
to recognize faces of a different race than their own. Crossracial identifications are generally inferior to within-race
identifications.
A jury instruction specifically tailored to safeguard
against cross-racial identification errors should serve to
enhance fairness and confidence in the criminal justice system.
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